Even though the BOJ is constrained by the limited additional monetary policyeasing options available, we believe the BOJ’s announcement today was stilldisappointing. No change was made to either the ¥80tr pa JGB buying program(we expected none), nor the NIRP, Negative Interest Rate Policy: we expected amove to -30bp from the current -10bp.
It is six months since the BOJ introduced the NIRP at -10bp on just a sliver of thebanking industry’s excess reserves. By way of comparison, the ECB ‘pays’ -40bpon all excess reserves held with them.
The BOJ did increase its equity ETF purchase program, to ¥6tr per yearfrom ¥3.3tr. This will have virtually no impact on either inflationary expectationsor economic growth.
The BOJ also provided two potential positives: 1) it demonstrated itsconfidence in the ongoing fiscal changes (the delayed consumption tax rateincrease, the government’s upcoming supplementary budget), and revised up itsFY3/18 real GDP forecast to 1.3% from 0.1%, 2) it announced a “comprehensiveassessment” of the QQE + NIRP monetary framework, to be presented at itsnext policy meeting, 20-21 September 2016. This could involve a transition frommonetary base targeting to targeting the rate of IOER (interest on excessreserves), and a schedule for the tapering of the JGB bond purchase program.
We are now forecasting the BOJ moving its rate of IOER ‘paid’ on Tier Threecurrent balances from the current -0.1% to -0.2% on 21 September 2016, and to-0.3% on 20 December 2016.
Fiscal policy: The Nikkei 29 July 2016 indicated that the supplementary budgetannouncement expected next Tuesday will have a headline of ¥28tr and onbudgetcash expenditures of ¥6tr. We believe the latter will include ¥2tr in thecurrent fiscal year. The government is maintaining its commitment to a primaryfiscal surplus in FY2020 (3/2021). We would regard such an announcement asconventional and moderately supportive to growth.
Our key take-away: We believe the government’s revealed policy prioritiesremain 1) corporate revitalisation, 2) fiscal reconstruction, 3) monetary reflation.
Please see from page 7 for more details. Stabilizing the public debt to GDP ratiovia financial repression has led Japan into a slow growth trap, in our opinion. Wehave been forecasting a trend appreciation in the Yen, but the move has beenmuch stronger than expected. Pages 10-15 have more on the Yen.